IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA CHARLOTTE DIVISION 3:97CR-23

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,)	
)	
)	
vs.)	ORDER
)	
)	
AQUILIA MARCIVICCI BARNETTE,)	
)	
Defendant.)	
)	
)	

THIS MATTER is before the Court upon the Defendant's <u>pro se</u> "Motion for Discharge and Release," filed July 13, 2010.¹ [Doc. 669.] A criminal defendant has no statutory or constitutional right to proceed <u>pro se</u> while simultaneously being represented by counsel. <u>See McKaskle v. Wiggins</u>, 465 U.S. 168, 183 (1984) (recognizing that a criminal defendant has no constitutional right to hybrid representation at trial). Consequently, a district court is not obligated to consider a counseled defendant's <u>pro se</u> motions. <u>See United States v. Essig</u>, 10 F.3d 968, 973 (3rd Cir. 1993).²

The Defendant is represented by appointed counsel. [Docs. 635, 667, 668.] Therefore,

¹In the Motion, the Defendant contends that he is entitled to release under the Uniform Commercial Code and the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.

²The Court notes that the local rules of the Western District of North Carolina limit the District Court's consideration of pro se motions filed by counseled criminal defendants:

[&]quot;Except for challenges to the effective assistance of counsel, the Court will not ordinarily entertain a motion filed by a criminal defendant who is still represented by counsel and has not formally waived his ... right to counsel in the presence of a judicial officer after being fully advised of the consequences of waiver...."

the Court declines to consider the instant <u>pro</u> <u>se</u> "Motion for Discharge and Release." Furthermore, the Defendant is advised that he should communicate with the Court only through his attorney.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Defendant's <u>pro se</u> "Motion for Discharge and Release" [Doc. 669] is DISMISSED without prejudice.

Signed: July 26, 2010

Richard L. Voorhees United States District Judge

³In its Response, the Government argues that the Defendant's motion should be construed as a prematurely-filed Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. [Doc. 670.] However, because the outcome would be the same – dismissal without prejudice – the Court declines to treat it as such.